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Abstract Most accounts of the function of anterior insula
in the human brain refer to concepts that are difficult to
formalize, such as feelings and awareness. The discovery
of signals that reflect risk assessment and risk learning,
however, opens the door to formal analysis. Hitherto,
activations have been correlated with objective versions of
risk and risk prediction error, but subjective versions
(influenced by pessimism/optimism or risk aversion/toler-
ance) exist. Activation in closely related cortical structures
has been found to be both objective (anterior cingulate
cortex) and subjective (inferior frontal gyrus). For this
quantitative analysis of uncertainty-induced neuronal acti-
vation to further understanding of insula’s role in feelings
and awareness, however, formalization and documentation
of the relation between uncertainty and feelings/awareness
will be needed. One obvious starting point is the link with
failure anxiety and error awareness.
Keywords Anterior insula  Risk  Risk prediction error 
Ambiguity  Uncertainty
Introduction
The anterior insula has been implicated in the translation of
bodily state into feelings (Craig 2002) and perhaps even
into awareness (Craig 2009), and therefore, it plays a
crucial role in the James–Lange theory that posits that
emotional feelings are the result of physiological changes
in one’s body. Recent evidence (Preuschoff et al. 2008)
suggests that, at the same time, the anterior insula is
engaged in at least one, purely mathematical task, namely
the tracking of risk. This involvement in rather cool cal-
culation does not necessarily contradict the idea that
anterior insula is also the gateway for subjective experi-
ence. Indeed, the Somatic Marker Hypothesis postulates,
among others, that rational decision theory requires emo-
tional anticipation of the outcomes (Bechara et al. 1997),
and hence, that seemingly cool behavior and emotional
decision making are intertwined.
Emotions, feelings and awareness are illusive concepts,
generally defying formal analysis. Measurements are
qualitative, or, at best, ordinal. This has hampered efforts to
delineate precisely the contribution of anterior insula in the
formation of awareness of one’s (emotional) ‘‘self.’’ The
involvement of anterior insula in the encoding of precise
quantitative features of the environment, namely, risk, may
provide an opportunity to improve inference. Indeed, risk
can be quantified in precise ways (Preuschoff and Bossaerts
2007; Preuschoff et al. 2008); formulae for its subjective
counterpart exist (Christopoulos et al. 2009); and awareness
can be tested using side-bets (Koch and Preuschoff 2007).
The purpose of this essay is (1) to clarify why risk
assessment is important, (2) to introduce the reader to the
measurement of risk and risk prediction error, (3) to elu-
cidate the role of anterior insula in assessment of risk, and
(4) to elaborate on the difference between objective and
subjective risk and whether risk encoding in anterior insula
is subjective. Many questions will remain unanswered,
especially with respect to awareness of risk, for which the
‘‘Discussion’’ section elaborates.
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Why is risk assessment important?
This question may at first seem odd: most humans appear
to be sensitive to risk, somehow they must be assessing
risk. In classical decision theory, however, risk aversion (or
its reference-dependent counterpart, loss aversion) emerges
not as the result of an evaluation of risk, to be traded off
against average expected rewards, but as a mere conse-
quence of nonlinearity in the subjective utility of the
reward. Specifically, risk aversion emerges when the
incremental utility decreases as more reward is given;
likewise, loss aversion is the consequence of higher
incremental utilities for rewards in the loss domain than in
the gain domain.
As a result, the decision maker may behave in a risk or
loss averse way without having to keep track of risk.
Nonlinear encoding of rewards would be sufficient to
generate behavior that looks as if the decision maker is risk
or loss averse (Koenig and Simmons 1994; Mihatsch and
Neuneier 2002; Pratt 1964). The brain does not need to
track risks independently of rewards.
One of the most convincing pieces of evidence in favor
of nonlinear encoding of rewards came up recently in a
human imaging study (Tom et al. 2007), where the usual
striatal activation associated with reward prediction errors
was found to exhibit the very nonlinearity that was con-
sistent with the loss aversion revealed in subjects’ choices.
As a result, subjects’ aversion to (downside) risk could
have merely been attributed to (subjective) nonlinearity in
the encoding of reward prediction errors. To generate the
behavior, no separate encoding of risk was needed.
To be more precise (Tom et al. 2007) probed subjects’
preferences for gambles in the gain and loss domain sep-
arately, and found that marginal utility for reducing losses
was greater than marginal utility for increasing gains. As
such, subjects exhibited loss aversion. This differential in
marginal utility was reflected in striatal activation: deacti-
vation for losses was higher per dollar than activation for
gains.
While risk encoding, therefore, is not needed to explain
risk-sensitive choices, it may be crucial for learning of
rewards in a stochastic (i.e., uncertain) environment.
Indeed, learning can be enhanced dramatically by modu-
lating the learning rate depending on the risk. While this is
explicit in Bayesian learning (e.g., the Kalman filter), the
intuition is quite simple. When risk is high, one’s predic-
tion errors are likely to be high, so outcomes (rewards) are
very noisy and one should not read much in one’s pre-
diction errors. As a result, the learning rate should be low.
Conversely, if risk is low, prediction errors are significant,
and the learning rate high.
Interestingly, reward-error-related firing of dopaminer-
gic neurons in the non-human primate brain appears to
reflect this: neuronal activation is higher when prediction
risk is lower (Tobler et al. 2005). One should consider that
to be evidence that risk is encoded in the brain, albeit
indirectly. This finding of risk-adapted encoding of reward
prediction errors has recently been confirmed in human
imaging analysis (Bunzeck et al. 2010). Traces of direct
risk encoding in dopaminergic neurons has been found in
the nonhuman primate brain (Fiorillo et al. 2003) and in
sub-cortical dopaminoceptive regions of the human brain
(Preuschoff et al. 2006).
However, the relation between risk and learning rate is
complex. When risk increases because the environment has
changed, learning rates should increase, so that recent
prediction errors are weighted more heavily, while pre-
diction errors from the past (and before the change in the
environment) are weighted less. Overall, when the envi-
ronment changes regularly (is unstable), the learning rate
should be higher. Plenty of behavioral support for this type
of adaptation of the learning rate with the stability of the
environment has emerged in recent years (Behrens et al.
2007; Nassar et al. 2009; Nursimulu et al. 2009). fMRI
analysis points to a crucial role of the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) in adaptation of learning rates (Behrens et al.
2007).
How to measure risk?
Risk has multiple facets. There is the typical size of one’s
prediction error (the variance, i.e., the expected squared
deviation of the outcome from one’s prediction). In addi-
tion, one may weigh differently negative prediction errors
(skewness, i.e., the expected third-order power of the pre-
diction error; or the expected shortfall, i.e., the expected
prediction error provided it is negative). In addition, one
may weigh outliers more heavily (kurtosis, i.e., the
expected fourth-order power of the prediction error), etc.
Decision theory prescribes, however, that risk is to be
measured foremost by variance. This is made explicit in
mean–variance choice theory (Kroll et al. 1984) or
Bayesian updating in a Gaussian world (Berger 1985), and
implicit in standard central limit theorems (where the
asymptotic distribution of predictions depends only on the
variance; Schervisch 1997). Not that skewness and kurtosis
are unimportant; their relevance is, however, only of sec-
ond order.
One interesting aspect of variance as a metric of risk is
its symmetry: positive prediction errors are weighted
equally heavily as negative prediction errors. This is
counter-intuitive in a choice context: one would expect
negative prediction errors (losses) to be weighted more
heavily. For learning, however, positive prediction errors
are equally important as negative prediction errors when
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setting one’s learning rate. Indeed, to ignore positive pre-
diction errors would be to throw away crucial information
about the risk in the environment needed to set one’s
learning rate optimally.
Proper assessment of risk pre-supposes that one has
learned the risk. As with reward learning, the crucial
ingredient to risk learning is the risk prediction error. This
equals the outcome (realized risk) minus anticipation
(expected risk). When measuring the anticipation as vari-
ance, it is the difference between the size (measured as the
square) of the prediction error minus the expectation of this
size (the expected squared prediction error, and hence, the
variance). Proper updating of the risk requires encoding of
this risk prediction error.
As we shall document later, activation in the anterior insula
reflects both (anticipated) risk and a risk prediction error,
where risk is measured as variance (of the reward prediction
error), and the risk prediction error is simply the squared
prediction error minus its expectation. As such, anterior insula
is known to play a crucial role in tracking of risk.
Encoding of risk and risk prediction errors
in anterior insula
Some early studies implicated anterior insula in risk
tracking (Huettel et al. 2005; Kuhnen and Knutson 2005;
Paulus et al. 2003), but risk was dealt with informally, even
if quantitatively. In Huettel et al. (2005), the risk was
measured in terms of probability of an odd event, with
probability ranging from 0.20 to 0.50. When measured as
variance, risk does increase with this probability, but
nonlinearly. In addition, task performance decreased with
probability of the odd event, so that insula activation could
be attributed to frustration rather than risk. Kuhnen and
Knutson (2005) used the same metric of risk, and showed
that anterior insula activation predicted risk avoiding
choices even after accounting for their risk measure. In
Paulus et al. (2003), risk ‘‘built’’ over time (risk-taking
increased as subjects deliberately waited to respond), so
insula activation may have reflected general attention, as in
Brass and Haggard (2007).
In Preuschoff et al. (2006, 2008), risk was dissociated
from expected reward to avoid confounding factors. The
task was simple. Each trial, a randomly shuffled deck of 10
cards numbered 1–10 was presented. Two cards were going
to be pulled out, consecutively. The subject first had to
predict whether the second card was going to be higher or
not. If she was right, she won $1; otherwise she lost $1.
Once the bet was submitted, the first card was pulled out,
and after a delay, the second card.
In this task, after seeing the first card, expected reward
increases linearly with the chance of winning (conditional
on the number on the card); risk (variance), however, first
increases and then decreases, to produce an inverted-U
pattern with minimum at the end points (zero and unit
probability of winning) and maximum in the middle (50%
chance of winning) (see Fig. 1a).
Using fMRI, two types of activations were localized in
the human brain, each with different timing duration.
Specifically, in the delay period between presentation of
the first card, phasic activations (those with a duration of
\1 s, modulo the hemodynamic response delay) were
searched for, as well as delayed activations (those that
started 1 s or more after card presentation, and lasted until
the end of the delay period, modulo the hemodynamic
response) (see Fig. 1b). Within the set of phasic activa-
tions, those that changed linearly with (mean-adjusted)
probability of reward were dissociated from those that
changed nonlinearly with probability of reward. The latter
were identified when the activation changed significantly
as a function of the square of the mean-adjusted reward
probability. Thus, four groups of activations were obtained.
Here, we are most interested in activations detected in
anterior insula. Significant activations were found both
phasic and delayed. The former increased with the square
of the mean-adjusted reward probability, suggesting a U-
shaped pattern as a function of reward probability, whereas
the latter decreased, indicating that activation is an inver-
ted-U function of reward probability (see Fig. 1c). Later-
ality is more pronounced for the delayed activation, with a
much larger cluster size (and significance) in left anterior
insula, but all patterns discussed below are the same in the
right anterior insula. Importantly, there were no regions
within anterior insula where activation changed linearly
with the reward probability, neither phasic nor delayed. As
such, all activations in anterior insula appear to roughly
conform to the pattern in Fig. 1a, although the phasic
activation has the opposite sign, that is, it is U-shaped as a
function of reward probability, not inverted-U-shaped.
The voxel with peak activation was then retained and
average activation across subjects was plotted against
probability of reward, to verify that the pattern of activa-
tion is indeed quadratic, with extrema at 50% probability
and at 0 and 100% probability. This was indeed the case for
the delayed activation (see Fig. 2a). The activation exhibits
the inverted-U-shaped pattern that is required for it to
reflect encoding of risk (variance). The signal is delayed,
which may be attributed to the fact that risk is forward-
looking: it concerns the uncertainty that is anticipated to be
resolved when card 2 is shown. Because of its anticipatory
nature, one can reasonably conjecture that the signal is
time-locked to the outcome (when card 2 is displayed).
Future studies could confirm this, by changing the delay to
display of card 2 and verifying that peak activation moves
accordingly.
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Identification of the nonlinear phasic activation in
anterior insula turned out to be more tricky. It indicates
correlation with the risk prediction error, that is, it
reflected the difference between the actual size of the
prediction error when card 1 was shown and the anticipated
size. The prediction error we are referring to here is the
difference between the actual reward forecast based on the
number on card 1 and its expectation before display of card
1. Figure 2b plots (in red) the average delayed activation,
across subjects, stratified by level of risk prediction error.
The relationship is linear and increasing.
The risk prediction error is backward-looking: it refers
to the difference between an outcome (the size of the
prediction error) and its anticipation before revelation (the
prediction risk). Notice that there is also a risk prediction
error upon display of card 2. It equals the difference
between the actual magnitude of the reward-error before
seeing card 2 and its expectation after seeing card 1.
Average activation in anterior insula across subjects is
plotted in Fig. 2b in blue, for each of the various values
that the risk prediction error could take on across trials.
There is one outlier, namely, when the risk prediction error
is zero. This happens only in trials where, after seeing the
first card, there is no risk left anymore (the first card is
either a 1 or a 10), so there is no risk prediction error either.
To contrast the timing of the activation related to
anticipation and to error, Fig. 3a displays the time courses
for trials that are stratified by level of risk and risk pre-
diction error (left anterior insula). Differentiation of the
anticipatory risk time courses builds only slowly, and peaks
when risk is realized (display of card 2). In contrast, dif-
ferentiation of the risk prediction error time courses fol-
lows immediately upon display of card 1, and peaks at the
usual hemodynamic response delay (*4 s). Figure 3b
localizes the risk and risk prediction error activations.
Activation in anterior insula correlating with risk pre-
diction error has been independently verified in an fMRI
analysis of the Iowa Gambling Task (d’Acremont et al.
2009b); there, risk prediction errors emerged after each
draw from a deck. Risk prediction errors were measured as
in Preuschoff et al. (2008).
Objective and subjective risk
In the aforementioned studies, risk (and risk prediction
error) is objective. Magnitudes are computed from the
actual chance numbers and outcomes, without any attempt
to impute subjectivity, through risk aversion. Perceived
risk could be magnified in risk averse agents, while dif-
ferences in objective risks may become insignificant for
risk-neutral agents. Evidence has recently emerged that risk
encoding in ACC is objective, while activation in inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) correlating with risk strongly increases
with risk aversion as revealed through subjects’ choices












































Fig. 1 a Expected reward (dashed line) increases linearly in the
reward probability; risk (red solid line), measured as reward variance,
increases for reward probabilities below 0.5, then decreases; the
relationships is quadratic, with equal minima at zero and unit
probability; from Preuschoff et al. (2006). b Phasic activation refers
to neuronal signals during the first second after display of the first
card; delayed activation refers to neuronal signals during the
remainder of the delay period between display of the first and second
cards; from Preuschoff et al. (2006). c Table of location of BOLD
signals in insula that change nonlinearly (quadratic relation) with
reward probability. Sign of t statistic indicates whether relationship is
U-shaped (positive) or inverted-U (negative); from supplementary
online material of Preuschoff et al. (2008), with signs added to
indicate directionality. Only nonlinear changes of insula activation
with reward probability emerged; the lack of linear correlation would
suggest that insula does not encode expected reward
648 Brain Struct Funct (2010) 214:645–653
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It is not known whether risk activation in anterior insula
reflects subjective risk. The finding that risk activation in
the closely connected IFG is subjective may carry over to
the anterior insula, but the delay period between display of
stimulus and outcome in (Christopoulos et al. 2009)
included a choice epoch, which could have interfered with
the delicate timing of risk and risk prediction error signal.
While a (subjective) risk signal emerged (unpublished
material), it did not survive whole brain correction. The
conjecture is, however, that risk encoding in anterior insula
is subjective, as anterior insula is thought to be crucial in
the formation of subjective feelings (Craig 2009). The
origin of all these risk-induced signals is not known.
Common innervation and mutual connectivity would sug-
gest that activations in insula, anterior cingulate and IFG
are related.
Subjectivity can be measured in different ways than just
risk aversion. Pessimism (overweighting of loss probabil-
ities) is one of them. Pessimism features prominently in
prospect theory, and recent imaging evidence shows that
expected reward signals in striatal regions correlate with
subjects’ pessimism (Berns et al. 2008; Hsu et al. 2009).
Further work is needed to elucidate the nature of subjec-
tivism in stochastic reward environments.
Discussion
From its role in emotions, the involvement of insula in risk
tracking should not come as a surprise. The lack of pre-
dictability of an event requires the body to be ready to take
the right action in case the event materializes. Imagine, for
instance, that a predator may be hiding somewhere with
some probability. At a minimum, the heartbeat should
increase, to be ready to react (fight/flight) in case the
predator does appear. Preparedness should increase with
uncertainty, and so should the heartbeat. The research on
such cardiac defense response is vast (Ramirez et al. 2005),
Fig. 2 Axial cross-section (left
panel) of the human brain with
localization of delayed
activation that decreased in the
squared deviation of reward
probability from 0.5. Left and
right anterior insula (ins)
emerge, and, in the same (axial)
plane, midbrain (thalamus)
activation (md). Pattern of mean
activation (right panel) (with
standard errors) as a function of
reward probability across 19
subjects in peak voxels of left
and right anterior insula.
Coronal cross-section (left
panel) of the human brain with
localization of phasic activation
after card 1 that increased in the
squared deviation of reward
probability from 0.5. Pattern of
mean activation (right panel)
(with standard errors) as a
function of risk prediction error
across 19 subjects in peak voxel
of right anterior insula. Shown
are mean activations after
display of card 1 (red) as well as
mean activations in the same
voxel after display of card 2
(blue)
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but association with uncertainty has yet to be fully
explored.
The anterior insula has not only been implicated in
awareness of one’s own emotions, but in empathizing with
those of others as well (Singer and Lamm 2009). To the
extent that other people’s emotions convey risk measure-
ment, are one’s own subjective risk assessments affected?
If so, one can easily envisage social contagion of risk
assessment [while the economics literature on contagion
actually focuses on transmission of reward shocks rather
than risk assessment (Bekaert et al. 2005)] [see Singer et al.
(2009) for further discussion of the link between risk
assessment and empathy].
Some of the evidence regarding the functionality of
anterior insula can be re-interpreted in terms of risk
assessment. For instance, the increase in activation fol-
lowing a low return in the trust game (Delgado et al. 2005)
or a low offer in the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al. 2003)
could be a risk prediction error—one did expect some
variation in the opponent’s actions, but the repayment or
the offer is way beyond one’s beliefs. The absence of insula
activation in borderline personality disorder patients (King-
Casas et al. 2008) can be seen as a lack of updating of
prediction risk, which could explain their inability to re-
calibrate beliefs about opponents’ strategies. Increases in
insula activation upon mis-timing of otherwise well-known
rhythms (Platel et al. 1997) likewise can be re-interpreted
in terms of risk tracking: subjects should feel that they can
predict familiar rhythms well, i.e., they anticipate small
prediction errors, but a mis-timing reveals that prediction
errors are larger than expected; in other words, a positive
risk prediction error occurs, and insula signals this
accordingly.
Anterior insula is by no means the only brain structure
where risk and risk prediction errors are encoded. We
already mentioned ACC and IFG before, which, while
interconnected with anterior insula, play distinct roles
[ACC encodes objective risk, while IFG risk signals cor-
relate with risk aversion; (Christopoulos et al. 2009)].
Together with amygdala, anterior insula, ACC and IFG are
thought to form a network of emotional salience (Seeley
et al. 2007), so activation of risk in any of these structures
should not come as a surprise.
The role of amygdala needs further elaboration, how-
ever. In pure risk tasks, where outcome probabilities are
known or have been learned, like in the card game we
discussed earlier, amygdala is rarely if ever activated.
Amygdala emerges as a crucial brain region in contexts
where outcome probabilities are not known (yet) (Hsu et al.
2005). Economists would refer to such situations as
‘‘ambiguous,’’ or using language from statistics, the
uncertainty involved could be called ‘‘estimation uncer-
tainty.’’ One can also observe this in single-unit recordings
of neuronal firing in the amygdala–hippocampus complex
Fig. 3 Time courses of phasic
(right) and delayed (left) BOLD
signal in left anterior insula,
stratified by level of prediction
risk error (right) or level of risk
(left); from Preuschoff et al.
(2008). Sagittal cross-section of
the human brain with
localization of clusters of
significant delayed activation
that decreases in the squared
probability of reward (reflecting
risk; blue) and significant phasic
activation that increases in the
squared probability of reward
(reflecting risk prediction error;
yellow). Time courses in a are
for peak voxels in these clusters
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(Rutishauser et al. 2006). Therefore, while insula is
engaged in tracking of pure risk, amygdala seems to be
functionally specialized in tracking estimation uncertainty.
To elaborate, ‘‘risk’’ is what remains after learning is
finished; it is unavoidable, irreducible uncertainty (e.g.,
even the best weather forecasts are imperfect), and risk is
encoded in anterior insula. In contrast, estimation uncer-
tainty is the amount of uncertainty that can be reduced over
time through learning (the novice weatherman can improve
forecasts with experience). Amygdala signals the latter. To
confirm this, future studies should attempt to correlate
changes in estimation uncertainty (as measured, e.g., by
Bayesian posterior variance) and activation in amygdala.
The old distinction of the functions of amygdala and
insula as reflecting ‘‘fear’’ and ‘‘disgust,’’ respectively,
capture well the difference between ambiguity and pure
risk. Most people fear the former [they are ambiguity
averse, to the point that they make irrational decisions
(Ellsberg 1961)], but they are not afraid of risk; they just
wish it were not there.
While risk assessment and risk learning can be quan-
tified precisely, and therefore, provide an opportunity to
study the wider role of anterior insula in humans’ ability
to build subjective feelings from their bodily state and
to become aware of them, the mathematics involved is
more complicated than for, say, reward assessment and
learning.
For instance, in reward prediction, the best forecast of
one’s intermediate forecast of a final outcome is the same
as the best forecast of the final outcome. This is the con-
sequence of a mathematical property of expectations,
called the law of iterated expectations. Unfortunately, the
law does not apply to risk when risk is measured as vari-
ance. As such, what one expects to be the typical mistake in
predicting the final outcome is not the same as the antici-
pated magnitude of the change in one’s intermediate
forecasts. The mathematical complexity raises the question
of how the human brain manages to cope with it [see
d’Acremont et al. (2009a) for details].
We discussed the relevance of risk assessment for
reward learning. In particular, optimal learning requires
one to change the learning rate depending on the envi-
ronment. How exactly the learning rate is to be changed is
complicated (Preuschoff and Bossaerts 2007), which again
makes one wonder how the brain may go about optimizing
the learning rate. One suggestion was made recently
(Bossaerts and Preuschoff 2009).
Most accounts of anterior insula focus on its role in
translating emotions into feelings and awareness. These are
intangible, elusive concepts. Yet at the same time, signals
in anterior insula point to involvement in a very concrete
and readily quantifiable task, namely, risk assessment. It is
to be hoped that further exploration of this involvement
would at the same time enhance our understanding of
anterior insula’s more difficult functionality.
For this to happen, however, the relationship between
uncertainty and feelings/awareness will have to be studied
more formally. Not much is known about the emotional
impact of volatility. Lo and Repin (2002) provides
emerging evidence: the heartbeat of professional traders in
financial markets changes only with volatility, and not
with, e.g., price drift, let alone its effect on awareness.
Potentially fruitful starting points include failure anxiety
and error awareness, which may be associated more read-
ily. Recent findings point to a link between mis-assessment
of signal-to-noise ratio and anxiety (see the article by
Ullsperger et al. in this issue), and studies of error aware-
ness have much in common with those of uncertainty, such
as the dissociation between error anticipation and error
encoding (see the article by M. Paulus and M. Stein in this
issue). In the latter context, it is interesting to note that the
sub-regional specialization between expectation of poten-
tial error (superior anterior insula) and post-response error
recording (inferior anterior insula) bears resemblance with
of the same specialization found in risk anticipation
(superior) and risk prediction error (inferior) (see Fig. 3b).
Likewise, the study of awareness of rare errors and the role
of locus coeruleus parallels the development of neurobio-
logical models of unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan
2003).
It is plausible to expect that uncertainty assessment is a
crucial modulator of awareness. Organisms, whose envi-
ronment changes too often for their innate reactions to
always be well adapted require an alertness system that is
triggered by uncertainty and that captures their bodily state
(emotions) and mental state (feelings) sufficiently strongly
so that learning ensues. Uncertainty carries a strong moti-
vational component, inducing organisms to explore when
gains are expected, and provoking defensive actions in
harmful situations. The resulting actions can be expected to
be more effective if they involve careful thought and
planning, which requires awareness.
A theory that integrates feelings and uncertainty, in
which anterior insula plays a crucial role has recently been
advanced (Singer et al. 2009). In it, predictions and real-
izations of bodily states are combined with predictions and
realizations of uncertainty, to generate an integrated feeling
state that is shaped by individual (subjective) risk prefer-
ences. Here, we propose to add awareness into the picture.
Recently, financial decision making has been linked to
awareness. Persaud et al. (2007) showed that betting suc-
cess is an effective tool to measure awareness. The dif-
ference between performance in a physical exercise and
success when betting on this performance appears to reflect
subliminal processing. This finding not only constitutes a
first step towards formalization of the link between
Brain Struct Funct (2010) 214:645–653 651
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awareness and risk assessment, but also shows that finan-
cial decision making requires awareness. As such, financial
decision making may become a crucial gauge with which
to measure awareness.
The link between uncertainty and bodily states and the
role of insula is easier to grasp. For instance, equally
intense pain is perceived as more painful if it is less pre-
dictable, and the encoding of pain anticipation in anterior
insula reflects the uncertainty of the pain stimulus rather
than the expectation (Carlsson et al. 2006). Similarly,
anxiety (neuroticism) is correlated with uncertainty-
induced insula brain activation (Paulus et al. 2003). Still,
there is a dearth of studies that simultaneously manipulate
uncertainty and bodily signals. Does heartbeat really
increase with variance as (Lo and Repin 2002) suggests?
What about skin conductance and other psychophysiolog-
ical indicators? Do frontal lesion patients in the Iowa
Gambling Task make disadvantageous decisions because
they have no emotional anticipation of risk, and therefore,
are not aware of the risks involved? etc.
Finally, because of the ubiquitous nature of uncertainty
in the environment, it would be interesting to explore
whether mal-adaptive behavior such as compulsive gam-
bling or addiction, as well as mental illnesses such as
anxiety disorder or schizophrenia are associated with
problems in risk learning, and to what extent anterior insula
is implicated. With respect to borderline personality dis-
order, evidence has recently emerged of abnormally low
insula activation following rejection in the well-known
trust game that can be interpreted as a lack of awareness
that forecasts of trustee behavior were wrong. The absence
of subsequent behavioral adjustment is consistent with this
lack of error encoding, as we discussed before (King-Casas
et al. 2008).
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